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Abstract Contact tracing forms a crucial part of the public-health toolbox in mitigating and understanding emergent pathogens and nascent disease outbreaks. Contact tracing in the United States was conducted during the pre-Omicron phase of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This tracing relied on voluntary reporting and responses, often using rapid antigen tests due to lack of accessibility to PCR tests. These limitations, combined with SARS-CoV-2’s propensity for asymptomatic transmission, raise the question “how reliable was contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States”? We answered this question using a Markov model to examine the efficiency with which transmission could be detected based on the design and response rates of contact tracing studies in the United States. Our results suggest that contact tracing protocols in the U.S. are unlikely to have identified more than 1.65% (95% uncertainty interval: 1.62-1.68%) of transmission events with PCR testing and 1.00% (95% uncertainty interval 0.98-1.02%) with rapid antigen testing. When considering a more robust contact tracing scenario, based on compliance rates in East Asia with PCR testing, this increases to 62.7% (95% uncertainty interval: 62.6-62.8%). We did not assume presence of asymptomatic transmission or superspreading, making our estimates upper bounds on the actual percentages traced. These findings highlight the limitations in interpretability for studies of SARS-CoV-2 disease spread based on U.S. contact tracing and underscore the vulnerability of the population to future disease outbreaks, for SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens. 

Introduction:A fundamental challenge in computational vaccinology is that most B-cell epitopes are conformational and therefore hard to predict from sequence alone. Another significant challenge is that a great deal of the amino acid sequence of a viral surface protein might not in fact be antigenic. Thus, identifying the regions of a protein that are most promising for vaccine design based on the degree of surface exposure may not lead to a clinically relevant immune response. Methods:Linear peptides selected by phage display experiments that have high affinity to the monoclonal antibody of interest (“mimotopes”) usually have similar physicochemical properties to the antigen epitope corresponding to that antibody. The sequences of these linear peptides can be used to find possible epitopes on the surface of the antigen structure or a homology model of the antigen in the absence of an antigen-antibody complex structure. Results and Discussion:Herein we describe two novel methods for mapping mimotopes to epitopes. The first is a novel algorithm named MimoTree that allows for gaps in the mimotopes and epitopes on the antigen. More specifically, a mimotope may have a gap that does not match to the epitope to allow it to adopt a conformation relevant for binding to an antibody, and residues may similarly be discontinuous in conformational epitopes. MimoTree is a fully automated epitope detection algorithm suitable for the identification of conformational as well as linear epitopes. The second is an ensemble approach, which combines the prediction results from MimoTree and two existing methods. 

As the COVID-19 pandemic progresses, widespread community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has ushered in a volatile era of viral immune evasion rather than the much-heralded stability of “endemicity” or “herd immunity.” At this point, an array of viral strains has rendered essentially all monoclonal antibody therapeutics obsolete and strongly undermined the impact of vaccinal immunity on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. In this work, we demonstrate that antibody escape resulting in evasion of pre-existing immunity is highly evolutionarily favored and likely to cause waves of short-term transmission. In the long-term, invading strains that induce weak cross-immunity against pre-existing strains may co-circulate with those pre-existing strains. This would result in the formation of serotypes that increase disease burden, complicate SARS-CoV-2 control, and raise the potential for increases in viral virulence. Less durable immunity does not drive positive selection as a trait, but such strains may transmit at high levels if they establish. Overall, our results draw attention to the importance of inter-strain cross-immunity as a driver of transmission trends and the importance of early immune evasion data to predict the trajectory of the pandemic. 

SARS-CoV-2 vaccinations were initially shown to substantially reduce risk of severe disease and death. However, pharmacokinetic (PK) waning and rapid viral evolution degrade neutralizing antibody (nAb) binding titers, causing loss of vaccinal protection. Additionally, there is inter-individual heterogeneity in the strength and durability of the vaccinal nAb response. Here, we propose a personalized booster strategy as a potential solution to this problem. Our model-based approach incorporates inter-individual heterogeneity in nAb response to primary SARS-CoV-2 vaccination into a pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PK/PD) model to project population-level heterogeneity in vaccinal protection. We further examine the impact of evolutionary immune evasion on vaccinal protection over time based on variant fold reduction in nAb potency. Our findings suggest viral evolution will decrease the effectiveness of vaccinal protection against severe disease, especially for individuals with a less durable immune response. More frequent boosting may restore vaccinal protection for individuals with a weaker immune response. Our analysis shows that the ECLIA RBD binding assay strongly predicts neutralization of sequence-matched pseudoviruses. This may be a useful tool for rapidly assessing individual immune protection. Our work suggests vaccinal protection against severe disease is not assured and identifies a potential path forward for reducing risk to immunologically vulnerable individuals. 

The rapid emergence of immune-evading viral variants of SARS-CoV-2 calls into question the practicality of a vaccine-only public-health strategy for managing the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It has been suggested that widespread vaccination is necessary to prevent the emergence of future immune-evading mutants. Here, we examined that proposition using stochastic computational models of viral transmission and mutation. Specifically, we looked at the likelihood of emergence of immune escape variants requiring multiple mutations and the impact of vaccination on this process. Our results suggest that the transmission rate of intermediate SARS-CoV-2 mutants will impact the rate at which novel immune-evading variants appear. While vaccination can lower the rate at which new variants appear, other interventions that reduce transmission can also have the same effect. Crucially, relying solely on widespread and repeated vaccination (vaccinating the entire population multiple times a year) is not sufficient to prevent the emergence of novel immune-evading strains, if transmission rates remain high within the population. Thus, vaccines alone are incapable of slowing the pace of evolution of immune evasion, and vaccinal protection against severe and fatal outcomes for COVID-19 patients is therefore not assured. 

The strategy of relying solely on current SARS-CoV-2 vaccines to halt SARS-CoV-2 transmission has proven infeasible. In response, many public-health authorities have advocated for using vaccines to limit mortality while permitting unchecked SARS-CoV-2 spread (“learning to live with the disease”). The feasibility of this strategy critically depends on the infection fatality rate (IFR) of SARS-CoV-2. An expectation exists that the IFR will decrease due to selection against virulence. In this work, we perform a viral fitness estimation to examine the basis for this expectation. Our findings suggest large increases in virulence for SARS-CoV-2 would result in minimal loss of transmissibility, implying that the IFR may vary freely under neutral evolutionary drift. We use an SEIRS model framework to examine the effect of hypothetical changes in the IFR on steady-state death tolls under COVID-19 endemicity. Our modeling suggests that endemic SARS-CoV-2 implies vast transmission resulting in yearly US COVID-19 death tolls numbering in the hundreds of thousands under many plausible scenarios, with even modest increases in the IFR leading to unsustainable mortality burdens. Our findings highlight the importance of enacting a concerted strategy and continued development of biomedical interventions to suppress SARS-CoV-2 transmission and slow its evolution. 

In the face of a long-running pandemic, understanding the drivers of ongoing SARS-CoV-2 transmission is crucial for the rational management of COVID-19 disease burden. Keeping schools open has emerged as a vital societal imperative during the pandemic, but in-school transmission of SARS-CoV-2 can contribute to further prolonging the pandemic. In this context, the role of schools in driving SARS-CoV-2 transmission acquires critical importance. Here we model in-school transmission from first principles to investigate the effectiveness of layered mitigation strategies on limiting in-school spread. We examined the effect of masks and air quality (ventilation, filtration and ionizers) on steady-state viral load in classrooms, as well as on the number of particles inhaled by an uninfected person. The effectiveness of these measures in limiting viral transmission was assessed for variants with different levels of mean viral load (ancestral, Delta, Omicron). Our results suggest that a layered mitigation strategy can be used effectively to limit in-school transmission, with certain limitations. First, poorly designed strategies (insufficient ventilation, no masks, staying open under high levels of community transmission) will permit in-school spread even if some level of mitigation is present. Second, for viral variants that are sufficiently contagious, it may be difficult to construct any set of interventions capable of blocking transmission once an infected individual is present, underscoring the importance of other measures. Our findings provide practical recommendations; in particular, the use of a layered mitigation strategy that is designed to limit transmission, with other measures such as frequent surveillance testing and smaller class sizes (such as by offering remote schooling options to those who prefer it) as needed.